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1. Introduction 
Political, legal, and moral conditions in many countries within the European Union, and 
beyond, compel admission of a certain number of asylum seekers.1 A notable difference be-
tween migrants and asylum seekers is that while to a greater or lesser extent migrants plan 
ahead and prepare for their move to a particular country, asylum seekers do not. One impor-
tant pre-move preparation is the acquisition of human capital, which will enhance earnings, 
such as, for instance, knowledge of the language of the country of destination. While asylum 
seekers cannot be expected to undertake such an investment prior to their unplanned depar-
ture, there is no reason not to expect them to consider acquiring human capital that will en-
hance their earnings after their arrival in the host country. Mitigating this expectation is the 
consideration that when this human capital is highly host-country-specific, it will confer little 
benefit when the asylum seeker returns to his country of origin assuming, of course, that re-
turn will become feasible once the adverse circumstances that prompted the need for asylum 
are reversed. This prospect should come as welcome news to the government of the asylum 
seeker’s host country, as it will have available to it a policy lever in a setting that it did not 
choose. If a larger investment in host-country-specific human capital enhances future produc-
tivity, earnings, and tax revenue, the government of the host country will want to induce and 
encourage such investment. One policy tool that is in the hands of the government is the 
probability of naturalization, assuming that the higher this is, the greater the incentive to the 
asylum seeker to invest in host-country-specific human capital. But before rushing to set a 
high level of probability, the government will want to weigh in the associated cost: after all, 
naturalization confers an entitlement to a package of goods and services associated with per-
manent residency or citizenship, and the provision of such a social package entails a fiscal 
burden. Presumably, the government will want to maximize its net revenue, weighing costs 
and returns, a behavior not very distinct from that of the asylum seeker. 
It appears then that we have in place all the components of a Stackelberg-type game: the 
government chooses the probability of naturalization from a set of feasible probability meas-
                                                 
1 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights establishes that “everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in 
other countries asylum from persecution”  
(article 14; http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf).  
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ures, well aware of the influence of its choice on an asylum seeker’s incentive to form 
host-country-specific human capital. Each asylum seeker “takes” the government’s choice and 
selects, from a set of feasible allocations, a level of investment in host-country-specific hu-
man capital which maximizes the present value of his net income. In turn, the government 
“takes” the asylum seekers’ optimal responses to the probability of naturalization and maxi-
mizes the net tax revenue.  
Several authors have recently contributed importantly to the scant research on the eco-
nomics of asylum seeking (Hatton, 2004; Facchini et al., 2006), and to our understanding of 
the political-economic aspects of the naturalization of migrants (Ortega, 2005; Mariani, 2007). 
Hatton (2004) studied the reasons for asylum seeking (in particular, conflicts and political op-
pression), and Facchini et al. (2006) studied policy coordination between countries that host 
asylum seekers. The purpose, approach, and focus of the current paper differ, however, from 
those of these two contributions: the reasons for seeking asylum are not looked at in any detail 
(the phenomenon of asylum seeking, in and by itself, is largely assumed rather than ex-
plained), and the inter-country “game” is out of bounds in an analysis that seeks to unravel 
what occurs within a given country. In the current paper the game of interest is that which is 
played in the host country between the government and the asylum seekers, not that which is 
played between countries. Ortega (2005) and Mariani (2007) developed political-economy 
(voting) theories of the granting of citizenship. These two studies relate to migrants. The cur-
rent paper draws however on a fundamental distinction between the characteristics and be-
havior of asylum seekers and those of migrants. The particular features of asylum seekers give 
rise to a set of policies which differ from those applied in the case of migrants. Thus, the cur-
rent paper complements the received literature and, in particular, provides a new microeco-
nomic framework for understanding the manner in which the government of the host country 
and the asylum seekers interact, and for predicting the outcome of that interaction. 
2. Analytical framework  
2.1 An asylum seeker’s optimal level of investment in host-country-specific human capital 
We model the active economic life in the host country of a representative asylum seeker 
over two periods. Let this asylum seeker be endowed with some general (fully internationally 
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transferable) human capital the amount of which we normalize at one - henceforth the unit 
endowment of labor - but with no host-country-specific human capital. At the beginning of 
the asylum seeker’s active economic life in the host country, the host country’s government 
announces the probability of naturalization ]1 ,0[∈α . The asylum seeker then bases his hu-
man capital acquisition decision (to be described below) on the government’s communiqué, 
anticipating that at the beginning of the second period of his life he will be naturalized with 
probability ]1 ,0[∈α . Naturalization confers entitlement to stay permanently in the host 
country and to receive there, just like any other citizen, the country’s social package. 
Denoting the proportion of the asylum seeker’s unit endowment of labor allocated to 
work by [0,1]l ∈ , the asylum seeker has a choice between working full-time ( 1l = ) and 
working part-time ( 1l < ), engaging in the formation of host-country-specific human capital in 
the remaining time (1 0l− > ). Work is rewarded by a competitive wage, 0w > , per efficiency 
unit of labor. Thus, the asylum seeker’s first-period earnings are given by wl .2 To allow for 
some exemption from taxation, it is assumed that wage earnings that are less than or equal to 
w~  carry no tax, while wage earnings higher than w~  are subjected to a fixed income tax rate, 
[0,1)t ∈ . Hence, the asylum seeker does not pay any taxes in the first period of his active 
economic life in the host country since his first-period wage earnings will, at most, be w~  
(and his first-period net income will be equal to wl , 0 wl w≤ ≤  ).  
The amount of host-country-specific human capital (measured in efficiency units), de-
noted by h , which is available to the asylum seeker in the second period of his active eco-
nomic life in the host country is yielded by the (twice continuously differentiable) human 
capital production function 
)1( lh −= φ ,  (1) 
where 
1)0( =φ ; (1 ) 0,   and  (1 ) 0   (0,1)l l lφ φ′ ′′− > − < ∀ ∈ , (2) 
and 
                                                 
2 The foregone earnings (1 )w l−  thus constitute the cost of forming host-country-specific human capital. 
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0
lim (1 ) 0
l
lφ→ ′ − = , 1lim (1 )l lφ→ ′ − = ∞ .  (3) 
Clearly then, (1 ) 1lφ − ≥  for all [0,1]l ∈ . If no destination-specific human capital is formed 
in the first period of the asylum seeker’s active economic life, the number of efficiency units 
of labor available to him in the second period remains equal to his unit endowment of labor. 
Otherwise, the number of efficiency units of labor available in the second period is increasing 
in the level of investment, but at a decreasing rate (cf. the conditions (2)). 
The level of the asylum seeker’s second-period income depends on the decision that he 
takes at the beginning of his active economic life which, in turn, is based on the announced 
naturalization policy of the government: when the asylum seeker is naturalized, his sec-
ond-period net income is (1 ) (1 )t w l tw Sφ− − + +  , where S is the host country’s social pack-
age given to all its citizens and permanent residents. However, with probability α−1 , the 
asylum seeker is not naturalized, in which case he returns to his home country where his in-
come is HW . To rule out the possibility that an asylum seeker who is naturalized chooses to 
return to his country of origin (for economic reasons), we further assume that Hw S W+ > .3 
Let the asylum seeker’s intertemporal utility function be defined over periodic income, 
and be given by 
( ) { [(1 ) (1 ) ] (1 ) ( )}HU u wl u t w l tw S u Wβ α φ α= + − − + + + −   , (4) 
where 0 1β< <  is the asylum seeker’s discount factor, and u exhibits the usual properties of 
a (twice continuously differentiable) utility function that is strictly concave in the level of in-
come, denoted by y, that is 
(0) 0u = ; ( ) 0, ( ) 0, ( ) 0 0u y u y u y y′ ′′> > < ∀ > ; and 
0
lim ( )
y
u y→ ′ = ∞ . (5) 
Taking the government-announced probability of naturalization as given, the asylum 
seeker chooses the optimal proportion of time allocated to work so as to maximize his ex-
                                                 
3 Clearly, w + S is the lowest level of net income that an asylum seeker who is naturalized will get in the host 
country. 
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pected utility from periodic income, cf. (4). This choice co-determines the optimal proportion 
of time invested in the formation of host-country-specific human capital. Differentiating (4) 
with respect to l yields 
{ ( ) (1 ) (1 ) [(1 ) (1 ) ]}U w u wl t l u t w l tw S
l
βα φ φ∂ ′ ′ ′= − − − − − + +∂     . (6) 
Given the properties of the functions )(⋅φ  and )(⋅u  as represented by the conditions (2), (3), 
and (5), it can be readily shown that U
l
∂
∂  has the properties 0liml
U
l→
∂ = ∞∂  and 1liml
U
l→
∂ = −∞∂ . 
Since U  is continuous on [0,1] , twice continuously differentiable on (0,1) , the preceding 
limits hold, and 
2
2
2 2
[ (1 ) (1 ) ((1 ) (1 ) )
           + (1 ) [ (1 )] ((1 ) (1 ) ) ( )] 0 (0,1),
U w t l u t w l tw S
l
t l u t w l tw S wu wl l
βα φ φ
βα φ φ
∂ ′′ ′= − − − − + +∂
′ ′′ ′′− − − − + + + < ∀ ∈
  
   
 (7) 
then U
l
∂
∂  is strictly decreasing in l  and “goes” from +∞  to −∞ . Therefore, there is ex-
actly one point where 0U
l
∂ =∂ , at which, since the second derivative of U  is strictly nega-
tive (cf. condition (7)), the second order condition for a maximum holds. That is, there exists 
an optimal interior level of * *( ) (0,1)l l α= ∈ , which is uniquely determined by the first order 
condition 
* * *(1 ) (1 ( )) [(1 ) (1 ( )) ] ( ( ))t l u t w l tw S u wlβα φ α φ α α′ ′ ′− − − − + + =   . (8) 
Equation (8) states that the optimal amount of time devoted to host-country-specific human 
capital formation in the first period of an asylum seeker’s active economic life just balances 
the marginal utility derived from first-period income (the right-hand side of (8)) and the dis-
counted expected marginal utility from second-period income (the left-hand side of (8)). The 
optimal time devoted to income generation in the first period of life is such that the marginal 
utility cost that arises from giving up work time, hence first-period earnings, has to be equal 
to the discounted expected second-period marginal utility gain that accrues from allocating 
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the first-period forgone work time to the formation of host-country-specific human capital. 
Moreover, from the asylum seeker’s optimization process we derive two implications: first, 
that choosing a positive level of host-country human capital formation will be the asylum 
seeker’s optimal response to an announced 100 percent chance of being naturalized 
( * *1
1
0 lim ( )l lα α→< ≡ ) and second, that the time invested in the formation of 
host-country-specific human capital will tend to entirely disappear if naturalization were per-
ceived to be highly unlikely ( * *0
0
lim ( ) 1l lα α→ ≡ = ).4 
Applying next the implicit function theorem to (8) with respect to l and α yields 
*( )l α
α
∂
∂ , 
the reaction coefficient of the asylum seeker to the government’s announced probability of 
naturalization 
*
* * *
2
2
( )
( ) (1 ) (1 ( )) [(1 ) (1 ( )) ]
l l
l t w l u t w l tw S
U
l α
α β φ α φ α
α
=
′ ′∂ − − − − + += ∂∂ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟∂⎝ ⎠
  
 < 0, (9) 
where the inequality sign in (9) follows from the condition (7) and the properties of φ (⋅) and 
u(⋅) as represented by the conditions (2), (3), and (5). Furthermore, we assume that 
2 *
2
(1 ( )) 0l αα
∂ − <∂  for ( )0,1α ∈ .
5  (10) 
From the preceding analysis of the behavior of a representative asylum seeker we con-
clude that it is optimal for him to allocate time to the formation of host-country-specific hu-
man capital that is * *11 ( ) (0,1 )l lα− ∈ −  as long as his naturalization probability is anticipated 
to be strictly positive, (0,1)α ∈ , and that an increase in α increases the asylum seeker’s op-
timal level of investment in host-country-specific human capital. Is it then optimal for the 
                                                 
4 The proof of these two implications is in the Appendix. 
5 Assumption (10) implies that the positive effect that the probability of naturalization exerts on the formation of 
destination-specific human capital wanes at higher levels of α: the asylum seekers tend to respond more strongly 
with human capital acquisition to an increase in the probability of naturalization from, say, 10 percent to 15 per-
cent than to an increase in the probability of naturalization from, say, 80 percent to 85 percent. 
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government to naturalize all the asylum seekers in its midst? 
2.2 The government’s optimal naturalization policy 
The government of the host country is aware of the decision process that guides a repre-
sentative asylum seeker’s choice of the level of investment in host-country-specific human 
capital in the first period of his active economic life in the host country, and of its dependence 
on the probability of naturalization. Therefore, the government incorporates the reactions of 
the asylum seekers to its announced probability of naturalization, α, in its decision. The gov-
ernment knows that increasing α  increases an asylum seeker’s optimal proportion of time 
invested in human capital formation (viz. that 
*( ) 0l αα
∂ <∂ ), which in turn increases the sub-
sequent optimal level of efficiency units of labor. Consequently, when n  is the total number 
of the asylum seekers in the host-country, the gross tax revenue to be collected from the natu-
ralized asylum seekers is  
*( ) [ (1 ( )) 1]R ntw lα α φ α= − − .  (11) 
Since 0α →  entails *( ) 1l α → , announcing that there is no chance to be naturalized entails 
no host-country-specific human capital formation and thereby no tax revenue, viz., 
0
lim ( ) 0Rα α→ = . Due to the properties of the φ (⋅) function as given by (2) and (3), and the reac-
tion coefficient as given by (9), it can easily be shown that the tax revenue, )(αR , is strictly 
positive and increases in (0,1).α ∈  Since 1α →  entails *( )l α → *1l , the maximum of the 
tax revenue approaches *1
1
lim ( ) [ (1 ) 1]R ntw lα α φ→ = − − , where we assume that )(αR  increases 
at a decreasing rate, 
0)( <′′ αR  for (0,1)α ∈ .  (12) 
This assumption together with the properties of the φ (⋅) and u(⋅) functions as represented by 
the conditions (2), (3), and (5) translate into a characterization of a (twice continuously dif-
ferentiable) tax revenue function R(⋅): it is strictly concave in )1 ,0(∈α , where we assume 
that 
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0
lim ( )Rα α→ ′ = ∞ .  (13) 
The government’s objective function is given then by 
( ) ( , )V R C n Sα α= − ,  (14) 
where ( , ),C n Sα  which represents the cost of naturalizing nα  of the asylum seekers, is as-
sumed to have, for all S, the following usual properties of a (continuously differentiable) cost 
function 
(0, ) 0C S = , ( , ) 0C n Sα α >  (0,1),α∀ ∈  and ∞<≡→ 00 ),(lim CSnCn ααα . (15) 
The government of the host country chooses the optimal probability of naturalization so as to 
maximize (14). The rationale for formulating (14) is that the government seeks to maximize 
its revenue from naturalizing nα  asylum seekers net of the cost of the naturalization because 
it has the welfare of its natural-born citizens in mind. Assuming that what the government col-
lects is transferred to its natural-born citizens, the welfare of the natural-born citizens will be 
higher the larger the government’s net revenue. Thus, in its game with the n  asylum seekers, 
the government will want to reap the highest possible net return to its naturalization invest-
ment. Differentiating V with respect to α  yields 
),()( SnnCRV ααα α−′=∂
∂ .  (16) 
From (13) and (15), it follows that α → 0 entails 
0
lim Vα α→
∂ = ∞∂ . Therefore, α → 0 will not 
maximize the net tax revenue to be collected from the population of naturalized asylum seek-
ers; any optimal choice of the probability of naturalization, given that it exists, must be posi-
tive. This is an interesting result, especially because it is derived for a cost function the prop-
erties of which are not exceptionally restrictive. What condition (15) calls for is that an asy-
lum seeker who returns to his country of origin does not inflict any further cost upon the host 
country, and that naturalizing “one more asylum seeker” entails an additional cost. Moreover, 
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(15) assumes that the cost of naturalizing only one asylum seeker is not prohibitively high, 
and that it gradually increases for small probabilities (proportions of n) of being allowed to 
stay in the host country (as is usually the case for linear or convex cost functions). 
Let us, furthermore, think of a population of asylum seekers that is not too small relative 
to the native population of the host country ( n  is relatively large). When a great majority of 
these asylum seekers are naturalized (α is large), naturalizing the remainder certainly requires 
an outlay larger than the per capita cost of the social package, ,S  since the existing infra-
structure of social and related services may not accommodate additional claimants. This 
would require assuming that the cost of naturalization increases at an increasing (or at least 
constant) rate. Moreover, thinking about a considerable number of asylum seekers, it is plau-
sible to assume that the marginal cost of naturalization exceeds the marginal tax revenue if all 
the asylum claims are positively adjudicated (α  → 1). These properties suggest complement-
ing condition (15) by 
( , ) 0C n Sαα α ≥  (0,1),α∀ ∈   and )(lim),(lim
11
αα ααα RSnCn ′> →→ . (15’) 
Given (12) and (15’), the government faces strictly concave revenue and convex cost. 
Since, moreover, the slope of the tax revenue function for 0α →  exceeds the slope of the 
cost function, there exists a unique interior optimum, * (0,1)α ∈ , which is given by the first 
order condition for the maximization problem of the government of the host country 
* *
* * * * * *( )(1 ( )) (1 ( )) 1 ( , )lntw l l nC n Sα
αφ α α φ α αα
∂⎛ ⎛ ⎞ ⎞′− + − − − =⎜ ⎜ ⎟ ⎟∂⎝ ⎝ ⎠ ⎠ , (17) 
where )( ** αl  and α
α
∂
∂ )( **l  are yielded by (8) and (9), respectively. The left-hand side of 
(17) is the (positive) additional revenue that the government collects from a small increase in 
the probability of naturalizing asylum seekers. The right-hand side of (17) is the associated 
marginal cost of naturalization. The optimal interior level of * (0,1)α ∈  just balances incre-
mental revenue and incremental cost. 
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From the preceding analysis of the behavior of the government of the host country we 
can conclude that, given the properties of the ( )R ⋅  and ( , )C ⋅ ⋅  functions (that is, properties 
(13) and (15)) a restrictive non-naturalization policy is never optimal for a rational govern-
ment, and that for an arbitrary naturalization probability below its optimal level, it always 
pays off to render naturalization more likely. 
3. Conclusions 
This paper is built on three premises. First, even though seeking asylum may not be the 
outcome of a natural individual choice, behavior following application for asylum can fully 
reflect standard rational optimizing behavior. Second, the public cost of adjudicating asylum 
status can be countered by tax receipts generated from asylum seekers’ (future) wage income. 
This income depends on the asylum seekers’ productivity which, in turn, depends on their 
host-country-specific human capital. Third, the government of the host country can affect this 
human capital by signaling to the asylum seekers how likely it is that they will be permitted to 
remain permanently in the country. Governments have available to them an array of policy 
instruments which sum up to such an indication. We have referred to these combined meas-
ures as the “probability of naturalization,” although the “granting of permanent residence 
along with the right to receive various social services” serves exactly the same role. 
An example of a testable implication of our analytical framework is that a higher natu-
ralization rate will be associated with the asylum seekers exhibiting a superior proficiency of 
the host country’s language, with causality running from the former to the latter rather than 
the other way around. One policy implication of the analysis is that the procedures and regu-
lations that govern naturalization can be designed to elicit behavior which increases the level 
of economic assimilation and brings the government’s associated net revenue to a maximum. 
Appendix 
We provide a proof that * *0
0
lim ( ) 1l lα α→ ≡ =  and that * *11lim ( ) 0l lα α→ ≡ > . 
For any )1,0(∈α , *0 ( ) 1l α≤ ≤ . Let * *0
0
lim ( )l lα α→ ≡  be the asylum seeker’s optimal re-
sponse, * *( )l l α= , to a probability of naturalization α , as 0→α . Assume that *0 1l < . Then, 
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taking the limit ( 0→α ) of both sides of (6), we have 
* * *
0 0 0
0 0
lim ( ) (1 ) (1 ) [(1 ) (1 ) ] limU wu wl w t l u t w l tw S
lα α
β φ φ α→ →
∂ ′ ′ ′= − − − − − + +∂      . (A1) 
Since the terms *0( )wu wl′   and * *0 0(1 ) (1 ) [(1 ) (1 ) ]w t l u t w l tw Sβ φ φ′ ′− − − − + +    in (A1) are 
finite numbers under assumptions (2) and (5), *0
0
lim ( ) 0U wu wl
lα →
∂ ′= >∂   . This contradicts the 
assumption that *0 1l <  is maximizing (4) given that 0→α . Therefore, we must have that 
*
0 1.l =  
Let * *1
1
lim ( )l lα α→ ≡  be the asylum seeker’s optimal response, * *( )l l α= , to a probability 
of naturalization α , as 1→α . Since from (9) we have that 
*
0lα
∂ <∂ , 
* *
1 00 1l l≤ < = . Assume 
that *1 0l = . Then, taking the limit (noting that *( )l α → *1l  as 1α → ) of both sides of (6), 
we have, assuming that ( )φ ⋅  is continuous in 1, that 
* *
1 1
* *
1 1
1 0 0
lim lim ( ) (1 ) [(1 ) (1) ] lim (1 )
l l
U w u wl w t u t w tw S l
lα
β φ φ→ → →
∂ ′ ′ ′= − − − + + −∂      . (A2) 
Since the term (1 ) [(1 ) (1) ]w t u t w tw Sβ φ′− − + +    in (A2) is a finite number under assump-
tions (2) and (5), from (3) and (5) we have that 
1
lim U
lα →
∂ = ∞∂ . This contradicts the assumption 
that *1 0l =  is maximizing (4) given that 1→α . Therefore, we must have that *1 0l > . 
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